Introduction
In this paper we analyze which bargaining system: individual or collective generates more unemployment, in a Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides (DMP) labor market using a wage equation derived from the usual surplus sharing rule in both systems. In general, models with frictional unemployment assume individual wage bargaining and only few papers analyze collective bargaining. Pissarides (1986) and Bauer and Lingens (2013) analyze under which conditions collective wage bargaining is e¢ cient. Ebell and Haefke (2006) , in a model with imperfect competition in the goods market, study which bargaining regime emerges as the stable institution. De la Croix (2006) , in a model with imperfect competition in the goods market, the e¤ect of di¤erent collective wage setting systems on employment. García and Sorolla (2013) in a model with matching frictions where matches last for one period which wage setting system generates frictional unemployment and Ranjan (2013) the role of labor market institutions on o¤shoring. Nevertheless none of the papers compares the same wage setting structure for both systems of wage setting, in this paper we compare individual and collective wage setting when both wages and employment are set at the same time or without commitment. The novelty of the paper is to derive the collective wage setting equation applying Ranjan (2013) approach to case where wages and employment are set simultaneously and wages are negotiated and compare the equilibrium with the one obtained with standard wage setting equation obtained with individual bargaining in Pissarides (2000) . The di¤erence with the collective wage equation obtained in Ranjan (2013) is that he considers the union monopoly model when a union sets unilaterally the wage before employment is decided.
Our results say that for a Cobb-Douglas production function, AL , < 1, if the bargaining power of the individual is high enough compared to the one of the union there is more unemployment at the individual level and the opposite is also true. When the individual and the union have the same bargaining power with respect to the …rm, if the cost of open a vacancy is high enough there is more unemployment when wages are set individually. Finally, for a constant marginal product of labor production function AL, when the individual worker and the union have the same bargaining power individual bargaining produces more unemployment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the standard pieces of the DMP model that one can …nd in any exposition of the model (for example Pissarides (2000) or Cahuc et al. (2014) ) and that will be used later: the equilibrium labor market ‡ows equation, the employment equation, and the value functions in the steady state. In section 3 we derive the individual wage equation and in section 4 the collective wage equation. The …nal section compares both equilibria and states the main results.
The Market Economy

Labor Market Flows
We assume matching frictions in the labor market where the matching function is X(t) = m(V (t); U (t)) where X are matches 1 , V vacancies and U the amount of unemployment.
Then U = (N L) where N is the total size of the work force that is constant and L is employment. We assume that m has constant returns to scale and m V > 0 and m U > 0. Then we de…ne
is the degree of the labor market tightness, and one can show that q 0 < 0. Also we de…ne
Assuming that a proportion 0 < < 1 of employed people loose the job, then employment ‡ows are given by the di¤erential equation:
When the labor market ‡ows are in equilibrium _ L = 0 the equilibrium labor markets ‡ows equation (the Beveridge curve) is:
where an increase in increases employment.
The Multiple-Worker (Large) Firm
We assume a production function Y = F (L) with F 0 > 0. The …rm chooses simultaneously L and V (vacancies) in order to maximize its value function V F , that is, the sum of discounted pro…ts along life,
where ! is the real wage, r the real interest rate, 0 the cost of open a vacancy, subject to the employment ‡ow equation given by (1), that is, the …rm maximizes:
if we assume that is constant (steady state), the …rst order condition gives the standard employment equation:
that says that the bene…ts of employing an additional unit of labor (a match)
We assume that 0 is proportional to the wage that is 0 = ! 3 .
and then the employment equation is:
where an increase in ! and reduce employment.
Value Functions in the Steady State
We denote the value function of an employed worker, that is, his expected discounted labor income along life that takes into account that he can change from employment to unemployment with the constant probability as V E . Then, as usual, the following asset value equation holds (see for example Cahuc et al. (2014) equation (10.6) or Pissarides (2000) equation (1.11)):
We denote the value function of an unemployed worker as V U and if is constant, that is, in an steady state, the following asset value equation holds 4 :
We know that the value function of the …rm, its expected discounted pro…ts, is
In an steady state where _ L = 0 we get
Then the value asset equation implies
2 See equation (3.7) in Pissarides (2000) or equation (9.46) in Cahuc et al. (2014) . 3 This assumption is standard in the literature, see the discussion on Pissarides (2000), P. 10 or P.74. 4 Pissarides (2000), equation 1.10 and Cahuc et al. (2014) equation 9.14. that is,
Finally we need to know the value function of a …rm of hiring an extra worker V 0 F at the steady state, that is
3 Individual Wage Setting
We consider the Nash situation where L and ! are set at the same time or without commitment. When there is individual wage setting each individual worker bargains the wage with the …rm. Then, when deciding the wage the function to maximize is
where (V E V U ) is the surplus that a worker gets if hired, V 0 F is the surplus that the …rm gets if it hires an extra worker and I is the bargaining power of the individual worker. This is the usual surplus sharing rule for individual wage setting, used normally in models with matching frictions. Then with individual wage setting the wage is chosen in order to maximize (10) subject to (6) and (9), then the function to maximize is:
that gives as a …rst order condition 6 :
One can also show that the …rst order condition imply that total surplus (V E V U + V 0 F ) is divided in such a way that: that is
Note that the wage setting rule says that the wage depends positively on the marginal product of labor. It is important to note that, because the wage is bargained between an employed worker and the …rm we substitute V E V U using only the asset value equation of an employed worker as Pissarides (2000) does on P.16. In the collective wage setting case when a union represents both employed and unemployed workers we will use the asset value equations of an employed and an employed worker to substitute V E V U .
Using (7) we get
Note that the wage setting rule says that the wage depends positively on the unemployment bene…t. Using (12) and (9) one gets
and …nally using (5)
Assuming that b 0 = b! such that b < 1then the individual wage equation is given by
that is the wage is a proportion m I = I 1 (1 I )b I of the marginal product of labor that depends on , having that an increase in increases the wage.
Collective Wage Setting
When there is collective wage setting we assume that a union that represents both employed and unemployed workers bargains the wage with the …rm 8 . In this case the function to maximize is
7 This is Pissarides (2000) equation 1.20 when 0 = !, that is ! = (1 Pissarides (1986) and Ranjan (2013) assume that the union sets unilaterally the wage. 9 This is the extension of the function proposed by Ranjan (2013) when the wage is negotiated.
V U is the expected value function of a worker and then
V U V U is the expected surplus of a worker. On the other hand S F is the surplus that the …rm gets when employing L workers. Finally C is the bargaining power of the union. Alternatively one may consider that in the collective bargaining system a union that represents only employed workers (insiders) bargains the wage with the …rm, in this case the function to maximize is
Note that operating (14) gives also (15). There are many options for de…ning the surplus of the …rm, S F , when there is agreement in the bargaining process and it employs L workers. We assume, as Ebell and Haefke (2006) , that in the event of disagreement the …rm is dissolved but, di¤erent from them, he must pay the costs of open vacancies because, by symmetry to the individual wage setting, they have been predetermined in advance 11 , in which case
. Then with collective wage setting the wage is chosen in order to maximize:
subject to (6) and (7). Substituting V E V U from (6) and (7) as in Ranjan (2013) 12 we obtain V E V U = ! b 0 r+ + q( ) and then the objective function is:
that gives the wage equation:
where in this case the wage depends on the average product of labor or labor productivity 13 .
10 This is the objective function proposed by Ebell and Haefke (2006) and Bauer and Lingens (2013) . As we said Ranjan (2013) and Pissarides (1986) consider the case where the union sets unilaterally the wage maximizing
respectively. 11 Ebell and Haefcke (2006) assume that if the …rm is disolved he has not to pay the cost of open vacancies in which case S F = V F . All the results derived below are also true for this case. On the other hand, Bauer and Lingens (2013) assume that if the …rm is separated from its current employees and time is continuous he can start producing in the next instant with new employees in which case:
The di¤erence with the case in which the union cares only about employed workers (insiders) is that in this case one computes V E V U only using (6) that is the usual assumption in the literature.
13 Considering Ebell and Haefke (2006) case where S F = V F the wage equation is Assuming also that b 0 = b! the wage equation becomes:
where now the wage is a proportion
of the average product of labor.
Equilibrium
As we said, the employment equation is given by:
and substituting the individual wage equation (13) in the employment equation (19) one gets the equilibrium labor market equation that gives :
and, simplifying, with individual wage setting I is given by:
Substituting the collective wage equation (18) in the employment equation (19) one gets
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas,
one obtains:
and, simplifying, with collective wage setting C is given by 14 :
Then, comparing both equilibria given by (20) and (21), one obtains the following propositions:
that is similar to the wage equation WS that appears in Bauer and Lingens (2013) . 14 If S F = V F equilibrium with collective wage setting gives
Proof: The right hand side of equations (20) and (21) is identical 15 , equal to one when = 0 and increasing in because q 0 < 0. The left hand side of equation (21) i and the constant straight line crosses to the right hand side curve below the crossing of the straight line with negative slope and the right hand side curve, then c < I and, using the equilibrium labor market ‡ows equation, L C < L I .
When I = C = one can prove the following.
Proposition 2 If I = C = and is high enough then there is more unemployment with individual wage setting.
Proof: In this case the value of the straight line is h 1 b + b i and the intercept of the straight line with negative slope is
Then if is big enough the straight line with negative slope is really steeper crossing to the right hand side curve below the crossing of the constant straight line and the right hand side curve, then I < C and, using the equilibrium labor market ‡ows equation, L I < L C .
Finally, if the production function is F (L) = AL, that is = 1; then the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 If = 1 and I = C = then there is more unemployment with individual wage setting.
Proof: in this case the constant straight line corresponds to 1 b + b and the intercept of the straight line with negative slope is also 1 b + b which means that when is positive the straight line with negative slope is below the constant straight line and intersects the right hand side curve for a lower , then I < C and, using the equilibrium labor market ‡ows equation, L I < L C .
